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Undermining the State? Informal Mining and Trajectories of State
Formation in Eastern Mindanao, Philippines
Boris Verbrugge
Conﬂict Research Group, Ghent University, Belgium
ABSTRACT: Building on critical perspectives on the state and the informal economy, this
article provides an analysis of the “state of the state” on the eastern Mindanao mineral
frontier. In the ﬁrst instance, the author explains that the massive expansion of informal
small-scale gold mining, instead of undermining state rule, has given rise to joint
institutions of extraction that promote the interests of local politicians and informal miners,
amongst others. Relying on the coercive and legitimizing strengths of local state institutions,
local politicians have created an environment conducive to the persistence and arguably the
further expansion of small-scale gold mining. In the process, they not only beef up their
personal authority and the state’s ﬁscal revenues, but also contribute to the consolidation of
state rule on the upland frontier. Transcending the local level, this parallel process of small-
scale mining expansion and state consolidation, the author argues, can be understood as the
result of a long-standing tradition of decentralized state building through local strongmen-
politicians. Finally, attention is drawn to the expansion of large-scale mining and how it is
highly likely to upset the sociopolitical stability built around joint extraction regimes in the
informal small-scale mining economy.
Keywords: Philippines; Mindanao; artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM); state formation;
informal economy
1. Introduction
In recent decades, small-scale gold mining in the Philippines has expanded on a massive scale.1
While accurate quantitative data are unavailable, not least due to pervasive informality in both the
production and trade in gold, ofﬁcial gold sales to the Philippine central bank by small-scale
miners nonetheless provide a good indication of this upward trend (Figure 1). In several years,
ofﬁcial small-scale gold sales even surpassed the gross production value of large-scale metallic
mining. After reaching an all-time high of 42.9 billion Philippine pesos (PHP) (around $1
billion) in 2010, and despite historically high gold prices, by 2013 ofﬁcial gold sales had plum-
meted to a triﬂing PHP 0.3 billion (under $7 million).2 Rather than reﬂecting a profound crisis in
the small-scale mining (SSM) sector, this dramatic drop – according to countless key informants
and numerous media reports – is ﬁrst of all the result of new taxes on gold sales imposed in 2011
that have nurtured the growth of parallel, clandestine gold trading networks. While the export of
© 2015 BCAS, Inc.
Correspondence Address: Boris Verbrugge, Conﬂict Research Group, Ghent University, Universiteitstraat 8,
B-9000 Ghent, Belgium. Email: boris.verbrugge@ugent.be
1Note that I consistently use the term small-scale mining (SSM), the legal and popular term in the Philip-
pines, rather than the internationally established term artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM).
2All dollars are US dollars unless otherwise noted.
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SSM gold is prohibited by law (small-scale miners are legally bound to sell their gold to the
central bank), unofﬁcial estimates from traders and government ofﬁcials suggest that a staggering
90 percent of small-scale gold production, while typically processed locally, is now smuggled to
Hong Kong and then onwards to mainland China.3 In 2011, Hong Kong authorities recorded
81,192 kilograms of gold imported from the Philippines, while ofﬁcial Philippine export data
(i.e., gold exported by large-scale mining companies) amounted to only 3 percent of this
volume. Using the average 2011 gold price as our point of reference,4 illegal exports of SSM
gold to Hong Kong alone were worth at least $4.5 billion.
In addition to the unofﬁcial trade in gold, at least in the eyes of the national government, the
overwhelming majority of SSM operations are taking place “illegally,” that is, outside govern-
ment-designated SSM areas (Minahang Bayan). As I will discuss in Section 2, the existence of
a sizeable “illegal” mining economy is usually treated as a harbinger of state weakness. Building
on critical debates concerning the relationship between the informal (mining) economy and the
state, I interrogate this proposition through an empirical inquiry into the anatomy of the local
state on the small-scale gold mining frontier in Compostela Valley Province, on the southern
island of Mindanao.5 I explain in Section 3 that the expansion of informal small-scale gold
mining, rather than undermining state power, has paradoxically gone hand in hand with a conso-
lidation of state rule at the local level. Rather than resulting from a deliberate top-down strategy on
the part of a national state seeking to extend its ﬁscal-regulatory control over the “unruly
uplands,”6 this localized process of state consolidation is the result of a bottom-up engagement
with the state: this engagement legitimizes and enforces “joint institutions of extraction”7 centered
Figure 1. Gross production value in large-scale mining and small-scale mining,a in billion PHPb.
Notes: aOfﬁcial gold sales to the central bank. bOne billion PHP equals approximately US$25 million.
Source: www.mgb.gov.ph.
3See, for example, Francisco 2012.
4In 2011, the gold price averaged $1571 per troy ounce, or approximately $55.40 per gram. Data were
retrieved from http://www.nma.org/pdf/gold/his_gold_prices.pdf (accessed 8 September 2014).
5The empirical material presented in this article was collected during eight months of ﬁeld research in mining
areas throughout the Philippines, with a particular focus on Compostela Valley Province. More than 200
open-ended interviews and many more informal discussions were conducted, with a prime focus on
small-scale miners, upland settlers and local politicians.
6Scott 2009.
7Snyder 2006.
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around protection services and the “informal formalization”8 of land and mining rights in an
otherwise volatile frontier setting. While local miner-politicians bank on small-scale mining as
a source of rents and ﬁscal revenues and as a platform to assert their authority, a heterogeneous
coalition of “capital interests”9 vested in the SSM sector simultaneously beneﬁts from a regulat-
ory environment conducive to the sector’s survival and expansion.
In Section 4, this parallel process of SSM expansion and state consolidation is critically eval-
uated in the context of broader trajectories of state formation. In the ﬁrst instance, I argue that the
mutual entanglement between local state politics and the informal mining economy, epitomized
by the joint institutions of extraction described in Section 3, should not be treated as a deformation
of the Philippine state, but instead as an intricate product of a long-standing tradition of decen-
tralized state building. In exchange for pacifying the frontier and for upholding the normative
supremacy of democratic state rule,10 local elites enjoy a high degree of autonomy in the local
political economy.11
Up to this point, my empirical account reads as a story of an advancing resource frontier that
gradually becomes incorporated into the circuitries of the decentralized Philippine state.12 At the
same time, however, Section 4 offers a timely reminder of the inherent volatility of resource fron-
tiers that stand in continuous interaction with trends in global commodity markets.13 Speciﬁcally,
rising global demand for minerals in recent years has sparked not only a new SSM boom, but also
a renewed interest in eastern Mindanao on the part of large-scale mining companies. The extent
and consequences of large-scale mining expansion remain to be seen, but initial observations
suggest that it may portend a partial breakdown of joint institutions of extraction, with potentially
grave consequences for sociopolitical stability.
2. State Resilience and the Informal Mining Economy
2.1. The Persistence of Illegal Mining: A Harbinger of State Weakness?
For academic observers working from different disciplinary backgrounds, the existence of a size-
able illegal mining sector poses particular challenges for state resilience. Fiscal sociologists for
one would argue that the central state’s inability to extract revenues from small-scale mining
weakens its ﬁnancial capacity and hence its ability to deliver vital public services, thus undermin-
ing its authority and legitimacy.14 As John Di John 2010 notes:
the extent to which the state monopolizes tax collection, the territorial reach of the revenue authority,
tax levels, tax effort, the diversity of tax revenues and the manner in which tax is collected – all
contribute to identifying the likelihood of state resilience.15
Other authors engaged in debates on the political economy/ecology of resource extraction suggest
that the availability of lootable resources (resources that require minimal bureaucratic
infrastructure to extract and tax;16) provides ample opportunities for rent-seeking outside
8Benjaminsen and Lund 2003.
9Verbrugge 2014.
10Abinales 2000 and Wong 2006.
11Sidel 1999 and Lara and Schoofs 2013.
12This point was thoughtfully raised by one of the anonymous reviewers.
13Tsing 2003, 5101.
14Examples include Levi 1988, Bräutigam et al. 2008 and Larsson 2013.
15Di John 2010.
16Le Billon 2001.
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formal structures, which may in turn facilitate the formation of alternative power centers built
around these resource rents. Examples may include warlord-politicians who cultivate their own
patronage networks17 or secessionist rebel movements that explicitly seek to contest state
power.18 Building on these observations, authors like Carolyn Nordstrom and Mark Dufﬁeld19
argue that the formation of what they describe as “shadow networks” or even “shadow states”
has been facilitated by globalization, with increased global demand for illegal or even illicit
goods, combined with the availability of a transnational structure for trading these goods, allow-
ing local actors to bypass formal state structures and connect directly with transnational capital.
Yet another deﬁning characteristic of the shadows is the pervasive blurring of boundaries between
formal–informal, legal–illegal and state–non-state: “While these networks are not comprised by
states themselves,” Nordstrom 2000 explains, “neither are they entirely distinct from, or opposite
to, states – they work both through and around formal state representatives and institutions.”20
Nonetheless, given the authority and resources at their disposal, state actors often occupy key pos-
itions in shadow networks, but as rational actors seeking to maximize self-interest rather than as
apologists of legal-bureaucratic state rule. In the long run, therefore, this self-interested instru-
mentalization of the state is likely to undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of state
institutions.
In this rather deterministic set of literature, ASM has come to occupy a prominent place. First,
given their speciﬁc materiality, the alluvial mineral deposits of gold, diamonds and gems that
ASM targets are highly lootable.21 Second, for geophysical reasons, ASM usually takes place
in peripheral regions, where the presence of state institutions is a priori limited.22 Third, ASM
camps are often depicted as violent and anarchic spaces, replete with uprooted young males
prone to rebel against vested authorities.23
2.2. Rethinking the Relationship Between State Formation and the Informal Economy
This dominant interpretation of the illegal mining economy as a harbinger of state weakness has
been criticized on a number of accounts. For one, authors like Linda Weiss and Kate Meagher
have demonstrated that state institutions actually play a key role in facilitating long-term
processes of “informalization,” understood as an integral response of capitalism to a crisis of
accumulation in the formal economy.24 More precisely, through ambiguous and inconsistent
policies and lax law enforcement, states create both incentives and opportunities for employers
to hire informal labor. Meanwhile, empirical studies of the state “from below” indicate a high
degree of implicit or explicit support for informal economic activities by local state ofﬁcials
who are motivated by political (support from the huge number of people involved in the informal
economy) and/or by personal (augmenting meager government wages) reasons.25 Local state
ofﬁcials are known to bank on the networks and authority vested in formal statehood to regulate
17Reno 1999.
18Collier and Hoefﬂer 2004 famously argued that rebellion in the post–cold war era is motivated by greed
rather than grievance. This argument has been hotly debated and reﬁned in the burgeoning literature on the
“resource curse.” For an overview of the existing evidence base, see Cuvelier et al. 2013.
19Dufﬁeld 2001, Nordstrom 2000, 2004; but see also Reno 1995, 1999.
20Nordstrom 2000, 36.
21Le Billon 2001.
22Fisher 2008.
23Le Billon 2008.
24Weiss 1987 and Meagher 1995.
25Rubbers 2007.
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access to – and shape the rules in – the informal economy and to cultivate clientelistic ties with
informal economic actors.26
Richard Snyder, meanwhile, has developed an institutionalist critique of the literature on the
“resource curse,” drawing attention to the possible development of “joint institutions of extrac-
tion” that enable “cooperation between private and public actors who share income by exploiting
resources.”27 Joint extraction regimes would allow for the income from lootable resources to be
used to “provide the revenue with which to govern and, thus, produce not disorder but stability.”28
In a similar vein, other authors have drawn attention to how economic self-interests vested in the
informal economy might actually ﬁt in with a broader elite pact geared toward the maintenance of
sociopolitical stability.29
While the existence of unofﬁcial ties between state ofﬁcials and the informal economy is also
recognized in the literature on the shadows (see Section 3.1), these authors share a critical but less
essentialist and more empirically grounded approach toward the state. In recent years, this approach
has been strengthened by a blossoming ﬁeld of literature on “the anthropology of the state,”30 which
aims to criticize and transcend established perspectives on the state as a ﬁxed set of formal–legal
institutions. Instead, state formation is approached as a ﬂuid and dynamic process that involves a
broad range of actors, both public and private, who draw upon the “idea of the state”31 as an abstract
and neutral source of political authority and as a legitimizing repertoire to underpin claims to public
authority. Seen from this perspective, rather than being an inevitable distortion of legal-bureaucratic
rationality, the reliance of state actors on the registers of state rule to extend control over the informal
economy can, somewhat paradoxically, strengthen the “fantasy of the state”32 as a unitary, objective
and hierarchically organized institutional conﬁguration.
Combining these critical approaches results in an understanding of the state as a dynamic
institutional conﬁguration with intricate ties to the informal economy. Such an understanding
will form the analytical basis for the empirical analysis presented in the remainder of this
article. In the ﬁrst instance, I argue that at the local level, the interests of the state and those of
actors in the purportedly informal mining economy have become intimately intertwined in
joint institutions of extraction. This joint extraction regime at the local level is in turn embedded
in a broader elite pact between local- and national-level political elites, with the former receiving a
high degree of local political and economic autonomy in return for upholding sociopolitical
stability and representing state rule on the frontier. Finally, I draw attention to the looming expan-
sion of large-scale mining and how it risks upsetting not merely joint extraction regimes but the
sociopolitical stability they generate as well.
3. State Formation and Joint Extraction Regimes on the Informal Mining Frontier
3.1. Snapshots of Informal Mining in Compostela Valley
Based on a combination of personal observations and estimates made by key informants, as of late
2012 the uplands of Compostela Valley Province were home to at least forty small-scale gold
mining areas, employing tens if not hundreds of thousands of people. Aside from more
26Pattenden 2011.
27Snyder 2006, 948.
28Cuvelier et al. 2013, 962.
29Sherman 2003.
30Sharma and Gupta 2006, Eriksen 2011 and Vu 2010.
31Trouillot 2001 and Lund 2006.
32Hansen and Stepputat 2001.
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rudimentary panning and tunneling activities commonly associated with ASM, the province also
boasts a high number of advanced SSM operations with higher degrees of capitalization. These
involve pneumatic drills, explosives, mine trains, dump trucks, excavators and massive carbon-in-
pulp (CIP) processing plants. The output of these SSM operations consequently far exceeds that
of “normal” ASM (Figures 2 and 3).
To be sure, a fairly elaborate formal regulatory system exists for small-scale gold mining, with
Republic Act (RA) 7076 or the “people’s small-scale mining law” of 1991 as its centerpiece.33 RA
7076 devolved authority over small-scale mining to Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Boards
(P/CMRB) that are mandated to identify and legally recognize ofﬁcial SSM areas (Minahang
Bayan) and to award two-year renewable SSM contracts to operators inside these areas. For
various reasons, however, efforts to bring over small-scale mining into the state’s regulatory
fold through RA 7076 have so far proven unsuccessful. While an exhaustive review of the
reasons underlying persistent informality is beyond the scope of this article, some observations
are nonetheless appropriate here.
First, RA 7076 coexists uneasily with other legal mechanisms, and this gives rise to a complex
regulatory environment marked by overlaps and inconsistencies. For example, while RA 7076
was supposed to replace the older and more permissive Presidential Decree (PD) 1899, local gov-
ernments34 have continued to use PD 1899 to award SSM permits. A recent government ruling
Figure 2. Labor force in front of a tunnel portal in the Diwalwal gold rush area, Monkayo municipality.
33Relevant laws and regulations can be consulted on the website of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau, see
www.mgb.gov.ph.
34In descending order: region, province, municipality and barangay.
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against the use of PD 1899 has pushed a signiﬁcant number of SSM operations further into illeg-
ality. Second, national government agencies simply lack the capacity and resources to monitor
SSM activities. Third, the permit process is plagued by a high ﬁscal-administrative burden,
rampant rent-seeking and clientelism. While the P/CMRB responsible for regulating small-
scale mining are formally composed of different sectoral representatives, in practice they are
often dominated by the local executive, with the mayor and the governor in particular retaining
a high degree of discretion over the issuance of permits and the implementation of mining policies
in the locality.35 Fourth, obtaining a permit requires the consent of existing surface rights
holders.36 Increasingly, large tracts of land have been awarded to large-scale mining, whose
owners have often been unwilling to grant legal approval for small-scale mining. In other
areas, particularly those devoted to nature conservation, small-scale mining is simply prohibited.
Hence, critical questions can be raised regarding the government’s commitment to formaliz-
ing and supporting small-scale mining. Yet, the national government seems to prefer
large-scale, corporate mining, a point I discuss in depth in Section 4. In addition, ofﬁcial
permits that are released are typically awarded to the ﬁnanciers, landowners and/or
tunnel owners, excluding the labor force at large. This raises important questions – which I do
not address in this article – about who beneﬁts from a labor force bereft of formal–legal
recognition. Ultimately, and somewhat paradoxically, those who manage to negotiate their way
Figure 3. CIP processing plant, Diwalwal.
35Own observations, see also Jimeno 2009 and Wong et al. 2013.
36Usaid 2011.
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through the formal permit process are often those who no longer conform to the legal deﬁnition of
small-scale mining.
3.2. Stability and Friction on the Upland Frontier37
The settlement of the wider Davao region38 and its gradual incorporation into the postcolonial
body politic were intimately related to the extraction of the region’s vast resources.39 Evidence
(however scant) indicates that Compostela Valley was left largely untainted by the initial
expansion of plantation-based agriculture under American colonial tutelage in the ﬁrst half
of the nineteenth century. This changed after Philippine independence in 1946, when settlers
from the north of the country started arriving in the more remote “frontier regions” of Mind-
anao40 In tandem with the expansion of commercial logging, these settlers gradually moved
into the uplands. These upland regions were home to indigenous tribes who – in parallel
with processes elsewhere in Southeast Asia41 – retreated farther into the mountains after the
initial incursions of migrant settlers. Although successive governments have tried to support
the orderly settlement of Mindanao, migration to the upland frontier has been largely a spon-
taneous affair, taking place without government supervision. As a result, the uplands, most of
which are owned by the state as public land, have witnessed a proliferation of illegal
squatters.42
While this process of upland migration sparked localized tensions between incoming settlers
and indigenous inhabitants, in the immediate postwar decades the Davao frontier enjoyed a rela-
tively high degree of sociopolitical stability.43 Until the 1970s, land was still in ample supply, and
existing upland settlers willingly vacated plots of land in return for compensation. Indeed, rather
than being a question of dispossession, interviews with upland settlers suggest that the migrant
inﬂux led to an embryonic market for informal land claims, although the compensations newco-
mers offer were often ridiculously low. Furthermore, most in-migration followed a pattern of
“chain migration,” whereby “relatives, friends and village mates follow in the footsteps of the
pioneer settlers.”44 As a result, nascent upland communities were often dominated by a few
settler families that came from the same home region. As these settler families intermarried
with each other and with the region’s indigenous inhabitants, cross-cutting ties of kinship and soli-
darity began to emerge in upland communities. A ﬁnal albeit crucial contributing factor to the
stability of the Davao frontier, according to Patricio Abinales, was the role played by local strong-
men-politicians, who relied on a combination of personal charisma, patronage, coercion and the
legitimacy inherent to elected ofﬁcialdom to pacify the locality, all the while acting as a liaison
between Manila-based national elites and regional economic power brokers. I return to this
point in detail in Section 4.45
From the late 1960s onwards, however, several trends conspired to undermine frontier stab-
ility. One important factor was the gradual exhaustion of the land frontier, caused in part by the
aggressive expansion of extractive industries (particularly plantation agriculture, commercial
37The following historical account is based primarily on interviews with local landowners and other key
informants, including two anthropologists–historians. See also Abinales 2000 and Tiu 2005.
38Davao City is the major urban hub in eastern Mindanao.
39Abinales 2000.
40Wernstedt and Simkins 1965.
41Scott 2009.
42Abinales 2000, 100–101.
43These observations build on a combination of own ﬁeld research and Abinales 2000.
44Umehara and Bautista 2004, 65.
45Abinales 2000; Wong 2006.
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logging and to a lesser extent corporate mining) under the control of national-level elites.46
Indeed, growing local tensions over land access coincided with a centralization of power in the
hands of the martial law regime of dictator Ferdinand Marcos to the detriment of local strong-
men-politicians who were no longer able to fulﬁll their role as frontier stabilizers. Instead, the
regime increasingly came to rely on handpicked local allies and military might to maintain stab-
ility. In this increasingly polarized and repressive environment, the communist New People’s
Army (NPA) found fertile grounds for expansion, and by the early 1980s the uplands of
eastern Mindanao had become one of the hotspots in the increasingly brutal war between the
NPA and the Marcos regime. In this volatile environment, small-scale mining underwent a
massive expansion.
3.3. The Advancing Small-Scale Mining Frontier and the “Capital Interests”47
By the 1960s migrant settlers (particularly Igorot from the northern Cordillera mountains) with
prior experience in gold mining in their home region started panning for gold in the rivers and
creeks of Compostela Valley. They were soon joined by other upland settlers who were facing
difﬁculties in upland agriculture. Prior to the 1980s, small-scale gold mining had remained
truly small-scale in nature. In the 1980s, however, the sector expanded notably. In large part,
this expansion resulted from a crisis in capital-intensive corporate mining, caused by mounting
political-economic instability and a crisis in international commodity markets.48 A growing
number of unemployed, semi-skilled mine workers subsequently found their way into small-scale
mining, initiating small tunneling activities throughout the region. In the decades that followed,
some of these tunneling ventures underwent a process of capitalization initiated by a hetero-
geneous class of ﬁnanciers that included lowland merchant-agricultural capitalists, a handful of
local miners who had “struck it rich” and former employees in the higher echelons of corporate
mining. Meanwhile, armed groups roaming the uplands started providing protection-cum-
extortion services to this nascent class of SSM entrepreneurs. Under the impetus of these
“capital interests” and a seemingly inexhaustible supply of labor, small-scale gold mining steadily
expanded.
In recent years, skyrocketing gold prices have given renewed impetus to the expansion of
small-scale mining. This stimulated a further professionalization and capitalization of the
sector, epitomized by a proliferation of sophisticated processing facilities, mining laboratories
and medium-sized tunneling operations in increasingly remote upland areas. In this article, I
focus on one particular factor that has supported, or at least facilitated, the advancement of the
SSM frontier, namely, the progressive entanglement between the capital interests involved in
small-scale mining, on the one hand, and local state actors, on the other.
3.4. The Emergence of a Barangay-Centered Regulatory Order
In order to better understand the process of state consolidation on the SSM frontier, let us consider
the example of barangay Bukal in Nabunturan municipality. In the 1980s, amidst intensifying
confrontations between the NPA and the Philippine constabulary, small-scale gold mining
expanded in Bukal. Following the restoration of democracy at the local level in the late
46See, amongst others, Vitug 1993 and Abinales 2000; but their observations were conﬁrmed by my own
ﬁeld research ﬁndings.
47For a more elaborate history of small-scale mining expansion in Compostela Valley, and the “capital inter-
ests” involved in it, see Verbrugge 2014.
48This argument has been further developed in another article submitted for peer review.
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1980s–early 1990s, prominent members of local settler families formed an alliance with former
Davao del Norte provincial governor Prospero Amatong. In 1995 this alliance led to the creation
of barangay Bukal.49 For various reasons, several respondents referred to Bukal as a “special bar-
angay.” For one, Bukal is located entirely on public land, and a signiﬁcant part of its territory
coincides with a protected landscape. Hence, the national government has so far failed to recognize
human activity in the area, including the ubiquitous SSM activities. Notable exceptions include a
large-scale mining permit issued to Aldevinco as well as a certiﬁcate of ancestral domain title
(CADT) issued to a tribal association (Nasbatrico) under the 1997 Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act (IPRA). The IPRA gives indigenous tribes priority rights over the mineral resources underlying
their ancestral domain,50 but for reasons I cannot discuss at length here the tribal association lacks
the capacity and legitimacy to wield these priority rights effectively. Instead its role is now conﬁned
to the collection of checkpoint fees, which I discuss in detail below. In addition, unlike other bar-
angays, Bukal is not entitled to internal revenue allotments (IRA) from the national government,
usually the number one source of local government revenues. Instead, it depends on a combination
of yearly stipends from the province and municipality as well as locally raised revenues.
Following Bukal’s establishment in 1995, barangay ofﬁcials began registering informal land
claims, land transfers and other economic activities. For this purpose, the barangay (through baran-
gay ordinances) created several puroks, administrative subdivisions of the barangay. Over time, the
barangay emerged as the key regulatory authority in the local economy and in informal land markets,
and it became the ﬁrst point of call in the case of land and other disputes.51 Only when the barangay
captain fails to mediate effectively will a dispute be referred to the mayor, the formal judiciary or to
national government agencies. Remarkably, in addition to land tenure regimes sanctioned by the
national government, representatives of national government agencies and even local courts also
tend to take into consideration existing informal settlement patterns at the barangay level.
The barangay’s authority hinges on the support of local settler families. As elsewhere in the
Philippines, politics in Bukal is a “family affair,”52 with the ruling coalition including a few pro-
minent clans and families with representatives in local state institutions, the most important ones
being the barangay council, the purok and the Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO). Often
referred to as the Tanod or barangay police, these purportedly unarmed CVOs play a vital role
in keeping peace and order in the barangay, and they signiﬁcantly beef up the barangay’s coercive
capacity. While the CVO operates at the behest of the barangay captain, many of its members come
from local settler families. As one barangay ofﬁcial explained, “The CVO is controlling the area,
and several of the landowners and barangay ofﬁcials have trusted people in the CVO”.53 In
addition, at least in the case of Bukal, many of the CVOs have a history in the insurgency and
are familiar not only with rebel tactics but in some cases with the guerillas themselves.54 Here
another important function of the barangay comes into relief: the barangay as “frontline of the
state”55 in the ongoing conﬂict with the NPA. Asked about the security situation in the barangay,
the barangay captain stated: “I negotiate with everyone, the army, the NPA…”.56
49Interview with barangay ofﬁcials, Bukal, October 2012.
50Usaid 2011.
51For additional evidence concerning the regulatory role of local politicians in informal land markets, see
Gulane 2013.
52McCoy 1994.
53Interview with miner-landowner, Bukal, October 2012.
54Interview with barangay ofﬁcial, Nabunturan, February 2014; but see also Chap. 3 in Hedman and Sidel
2000.
55Interview with barangay ofﬁcial, New Bataan, February 2014.
56Interview with barangay captain, Bukal, February 2012.
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Before proceeding to the regulatory dynamics in small-scale gold mining, two additional
observations should be highlighted. These are crucial to understanding my argument. The
ﬁrst one is the blurring of boundaries between the capital interests in small-scale mining and
politics at the local level. As in many other mining barangays, barangay ofﬁcials in Bukal
are themselves among the vested interests in small-scale mining, either directly as mining ﬁnan-
ciers or indirectly as landowners who receive royalties from small-scale mining. Taking part in
electoral politics in the Philippines is a somewhat peculiar, informal and – according to most –
highly corrupt affair, with vote-buying being a deﬁning feature of elections at all levels. In
Bukal, as in other mining barangays, the price for a vote can go up to PHP 2000 ($50). So
what convinces miners to invest in politics? As Sidel explains, discretionary control over
local state institutions in the Philippines entails privileged access to accumulation opportunities
in the local economy.57 Indeed, barangay ofﬁcials use their priority access to the state and its
coercive machinery (the CVO) to protect and expand their own economic interests. Further-
more, they can use the state indirectly, as gatekeepers in the local economy, to solicit “contri-
butions” from those who desire to invest locally. Finally, local politicians have access to
broader, vertically organized political party networks that provide access to patronage from
higher ranking politicians.58 As we will see below, however, this image of local politicians
as rent-seekers is somewhat misleading, as it obscures an important degree of reciprocity in
local politics.
The second important observation relates to the increased centrality of formal–legal authority
in the exercise of public authority at the local level. While the barangay captain is typically
a charismatic ﬁgure, the prestige of elected ofﬁcialdom and social relations with higher
ranking politicians are undoubtedly a boon for his personal authority. In this sense, the nascent
barangay-centered regulatory order described above illustrates a broader process of state
penetration, not necessarily as a ﬁxed set of institutions but rather as a legitimizing repertoire
based on the idea of legal-bureaucratic rationality as an abstract and universal source of power.
Together, these two trends – the progressive entanglement between the local state and mining
capital and the increased reliance on the “idea of the state”59 as a legitimizing repertoire –
have enabled the emergence of “joint institutions of extraction”60 centered around the “informal
formalization”61 of local tenure relations by local politicians.
3.5. The Regulation of Informal Mining: From Brokerage to Informal Formalization
Understanding the machinations of regulatory authority in small-scale gold mining areas necessi-
tates a basic understanding of the process through which small-scale miners secure access to gold-
bearing land. Whenever small-scale miners want to explore or operate in a given area, they ﬁrst
need the consent of surface land claimants, who will typically receive a 10 percent royalty share.
Where local self-ﬁnanced miners or ﬁnanciers are familiar with the landowner in question, said
access can be negotiated directly. In other cases, ﬁnanciers approach the barangay captain as
the institutionalized representative of local landed interests and as the assumed pivot of local
security arrangements. A barangay ofﬁcial then steps in and connects the ﬁnancier with the land-
owner in question. In return, barangay ofﬁcials solicit a range of “contributions” from ﬁnanciers.
In some cases, these donations are monetary in form; in other cases, local ofﬁcials are granted the
57Sidel 1999.
58Landé 1968.
59Lund 2006.
60Snyder 2006.
61Benjaminsen and Lund 2003.
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“privilege” to operate a high-yielding tunnel (shifting). Since most ﬁnanciers ﬁnd it important to
be on good terms with local ofﬁcials in order to secure continued access to the area and to protect
their investment, these donations tend to assume a recurrent character. They are particularly pro-
minent in election periods, when rival politicians seek to woo ﬁnanciers into beeﬁng up their cam-
paign funds. Here it is also important to mention that when a ﬁnancier or landowner hits “high-
grade,”62 he will often be confronted with a range of other armed rent-seekers, which may include
army, police, CVOs, rebels and/or indistinct extortionist groups. While not wholly irrelevant for
this account, a detailed inquiry into these other rent-seekers is not only difﬁcult but would take us
too far aﬁeld, as our main concern lies with understanding the role of local state ofﬁcials in infor-
mal mining. Sufﬁce to say that in many cases, armed rent-seekers develop a mutual understanding
or at least a cohabitation arrangement with local state actors.
Over time, barangay ofﬁcials have transcended – but not cast off – their role as brokers in the
local economy. As gold mining operations expanded, they have developed sophisticated methods
to extract rents from – and expand their regulatory control over – informal mining. In several of
the mining barangays visited during my research, I found that the barangay is not just facilitating
but is now actively registering and sanctioning agreements between ﬁnanciers and landowners,
particularly where it concerns bigger tunneling operations. After an oral agreement is reached
between the respective parties, a written agreement is drafted by the purok or the barangay,
specifying the parties involved, the revenue sharing modalities and the conditions of withdrawal.
The registration of this agreement and the tunnel in question typically comes with a registration
fee, which is but one example of a much broader range of fees the barangay, and increasingly
also the municipality and province, are imposing on small-scale mining, gold buying and
gold processing. After paying these fees, small-scale miners and landowners are issued with
“ofﬁcial” receipts and a range of stamped documents, including community tax certiﬁcates,63
environmental permits, barangay- and municipal-clearances to operate in the area and business
permits.
These ﬁscal-regulatory efforts in small-scale gold mining were given renewed impetus when
a massive new gold rush enveloped Compostela Valley in the late 2000s. In ten “collection
centers” (read: roadblocks) spread out over seven municipalities (Table 1), representatives
from different local governments, together with tribal organizations in possession of a certiﬁcate
of ancestral domain and in some cases also with SSM permittees, started taxing ore transport. In
Bukal, two such checkpoints are located near the boundary with neighboring barangay Mainit.
In one of these checkpoints, the barangay and municipality are collecting, respectively, PHP
300 ($8) per dump truck and PHP 30 ($0.80) per bag. In the other checkpoint, the Mansaka
tribal association (Nasbatrico) is charging PHP 500 ($12) per dump truck. Similar to the
issuing of permits and clearances mentioned above, these payments invariably come with
stamped receipts.
Accurate revenue data were difﬁcult to collect at the barangay level, but barangay ofﬁcials
in Bukal explained that in addition to their own checkpoint revenues they are also entitled to
municipal collections in excess of PHP 100,000 ($2000) per year.64 The province of Compos-
tela Valley, meanwhile, keeps detailed accounts of these “mining revenues,” which are booked
either as donations or as environmental user’s fees (see Tables 1 and 2). In total, these revenues
62High-grade is a term that is very difﬁcult to deﬁne. In short, it simply means a lot of gold in a short time
span.
63A community tax certiﬁcate, or cedula, is the ﬁrst requirement in order to qualify for any kind of permit or
license or to conduct a business transaction in the barangay.
64Interview with barangay council member, Nabunturan, January 2014.
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Table 1. Comparative statement of mining fees, 2012.
Donations Environmental user’s fee
Collection center Rates to be collected and start of collection Rates to be collected Total
Tagnocon, Nabunturan P 10 (Aug. 2010) P 35,780 P 5 P 23,180 P 58,960
Camanlangan, New Bataan P 10 (Sept. 2011) P 443,115 P 5 P 221,370 P 664,485
Bugac, Mainit, Nabunturan P 5 (Nov. 2011) P 52,365 P 5 P 52,635 P 105,000
Golden Valley, Mabini P 5 (Nov. 2011) P 328,903 P 5 P 329,403 P 658,306
Ngan, Compostela P 5 (Sept. 2011) P 11,550 P 5 P 11,550 P 23,100
Mainit, Nabunturan P 5 (Dec. 2010) P 867,800 P 5 P 867,800 P 1,735,600
Mt. Diwalwal, Monkayo N/A (May 2011) P 5 P 298,463.50 P 298,463.50
New Leyte, Maco N/A (May 2012) P 5 P 71,970 P 71,970
Panoraon, Maco N/A (May 2012) P 5 P 58,661 P 58,661
Pamintaran, Maragusan P 15 (July 2009) P 3,238,991 P 5 P 0 P 3,238, 991
Total P 4,978,504 P 1,935,032.50 P 6,913,536.50
Source: Ofﬁce of the Provincial Treasurer, Compostela Valley.
Table 2. Comparative statement of revenue collected from mining operations, updated with data available as of April 2013.
Calendar year
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Sand and gravel tax P 2,052,168.48 P 2,535,159.97 P 2,431,745.26 P 2,269,868.26 P 2,740,493.70
Small-scale mining P 1,008,130.00 P 356,248.90 P 1,511,265.00
Environmental user’s fee P 1,070,472.74 P 1,641,860.83 P 4,601,425.43
Miscellaneous (donation) P 6,930,110.00 P 15,582,346.00 P 13,476,122.50 P 9,029,209.58
Occupation fee P 236,715.00 P 129,570.00
Excise tax P 317,994.65 P 4,039,431.91 P 2,620,839.00
Total P 2,052,168.48 P 9,465,269.97 P 20,410,688.65 P 22,020,247.40 P 19,632,802.01
Source: Ofﬁce of the Provincial Treasurer, Compostela Valley.
Note: The data displayed in Tables 1 and 2, as well as other additional information about these public revenues, were obtained with the kind permission of the provincial treasurer’s ofﬁce.
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far outstrip the share of excise tax collected from formal small-scale and large-scale mining
operations (see Table 2). In 2012, the province collected PHP 13.6 million (some $340,000).
While lower than in previous years, due to the devastating impact of typhoon Pablo, this
amount – according to the provincial treasurer – still adds up to approximately 65 percent of
ﬁscal revenues from mining and some 13 percent of locally raised revenues. At the same
time, the signiﬁcance of these revenues should not be exaggerated, as local governments con-
tinue to rely disproportionately on external resources, particularly the IRA, which accounts for
about 80 percent of provincial income.
Examining these ﬁscal-regulatory efforts, several legal paradoxes emerge. To be sure, most of
the interventions described above – even “donations” to local government – have a legal basis in
the 1991 local government code, which deﬁnes the mandate of local government units in the era
of decentralization. Furthermore, these regulatory interventions have gone hand in hand with a
range of local government executive orders and ordinances aimed at “rationalizing” (as local
government ofﬁcials referred to it) small-scale mining. Meanwhile, the legal status of many if
not most of the actual SSM operations remains unclear. For this reason, local politicians have
supported the formation of SSM cooperatives throughout the province. These cooperatives
subsequently applied for an ofﬁcial SSM permit, but for various reasons – prime among them
the overlap with large-scale mining – most of these requests are still pending and the areas in
question are now referred to as “proposed Minahang Bayan” (see Section 3.1). However, the
formation of legally registered (with the Cooperative Development Authority) SSM cooperatives
and the administrative trail left behind by these formalization attempts contribute to imbuing
small-scale mining with at least a semblance of legality.
3.6. Coercion, Legitimacy and Reciprocity in Joint Extraction Regimes
Two fundamental and interrelated questions remain: Why do SSM ﬁnanciers and landowners
comply with paying these donations, permit fees and transport taxes? and Where does the
money go? Initial clues with regard to the ﬁrst question can be derived from the literature on the
determinants of tax compliance, which argues that sustainable tax efforts hinge on a combination
of coercion – the capacity of authorities to monitor and enforce compliance – and legitimacy.65
At the same time, local politics in the Philippines are often depicted as a coercive and in
some cases even predatory affair, dominated by “local bosses” and warlord-politicians
(see Section 4).66
The role of coercion in local politics should not be underestimated. When asked about the
consequences of not paying transport fees, SSM ﬁnanciers replied that their trucks could be con-
ﬁscated by the provincial government or even by local ofﬁcials of the DENR (a national govern-
ment agency). Here it is also important to consider that Compostela Valley is home to armed
groups that are all involved in some way in informal mining, usually in the form of protection-
cum-extortion activities. Threats and actual acts of violence by these groups have targeted
mining and processing equipment (which sometimes mysteriously “catches ﬁre”), ore transport
and in some cases even the physical integrity of ﬁnanciers and/or their laborers. These armed
groups sometimes cultivate indistinct ties with local politicians, giving rise to “peculiar coercive
formations” (centered around local politicians and their private armies) that typically include
people from all sorts of backgrounds, including (former) military, police and even rebels.67
Over time, CVOs have come to occupy a central position in these peculiar coercive formations.
65See, for example, Levi 1988 and Levi and Sacks 2009.
66Sidel 1999; Kreuzer 2009.
67Hedman and Sidel 2000, 58.
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They are often mobilized by barangay ofﬁcials to protect their investment, as one landowner and
former barangay captain explained: “The CVO is in control of the mining area, and no goons are
allowed. Many of the CVOs are NPA returnees, some of them are also the relatives of landowners
or barangay ofﬁcials, and they are all locals.”68 In this opaque security environment, ﬁnanciers are
ever-wary of reprisal and, in Philippe Le Billon’s words, “sustain their access to resources and
protect their investments by paying ‘whoever is in power’.”69
Meanwhile, the revenues extracted from informal mining go into the private coffers of poli-
ticians. Even leaving aside “contributions” from ﬁnanciers to politicians, a signiﬁcant discrepancy
still exists between what the province claims as ofﬁcial checkpoint rates (PHP 10–15 per bag) and
what ﬁnanciers claim to be actually paying (PHP 30). Furthermore, politicians have a high degree
of discretion over the expenditure of these local revenues, which usually end up in a “general
fund” that serves as a patronage resource.70
While coercive and even predatory traits are evident in local politics in informal mining areas,
my empirical analysis has revealed a signiﬁcant degree of reciprocity between local politicians
and the capital interests in small-scale mining. Snyder describes this reciprocal arrangement as
“joint institutions of extraction” (see Section 2).71 On the one hand, local politicians devote
money to interventions that indirectly beneﬁt small-scale mine operators. Examples include the
construction of roads connecting SSM areas to lowland areas (where most of the processing
takes place) and the provision of basic services such as water and electricity. In addition, local
politicians are in charge of maintaining the (supposedly voluntary) CVO, which provides at
least some sense of security – however arbitrary – in mining areas.
More fundamentally, the broad range of ﬁscal-regulatory efforts described above seem to have
led to a process of “informal formalization”72 in local informal – at least from the eyes of the
national government – tenure regimes. The wide array of “ofﬁcial” documents, agreements,
permits and clearances, and associated fees and stamped receipts, all explicitly refer to state-
sanctioned legality as an abstract and universal source of legitimate authority.73 On the one
hand, this process of informal formalization contributes to a broad acceptance of rent extraction
by local state ofﬁcials as something normal and mundane: “Everywhere we go we ask permission
from the barangay.… They ask fees and donations; they do their work; we do not complain.”74
But informal formalization also beneﬁts the capital interests involved in small-scale mining by
imbuing local tenure regimes with a sense of predictability. For landowners, the registration
and sanctioning of landowner–ﬁnancier agreements by the barangay further consolidates their
informal land claims and associated royalties. For ﬁnanciers, compliance with these contributions,
fees and donations should be understood as part of a broader strategy aimed at securing access to a
high-value, geographically ﬁxed resource in a frontier setting with an opaque security environ-
ment and, at ﬁrst sight, indistinct surface tenure systems. This reciprocity between SSM interests
and local politicians is reminiscent of Thomas Sikor and Christian Lund’s observation about the
recursive constitution of property and authority: “The process of recognition of claims as property
simultaneously works to imbue the institution that provides such recognition with the recognition
of its authority to do so. This is the ‘contract’ that links property and authority.”75
68Interview, Bukal, October 2012.
69Le Billon 2001, 569.
70Interview Melvin Lamanilao, Revenue Watch Philippines, Davao City, February 2014.
71Snyder 2006.
72Benjaminsen and Lund 2003.
73Sharma and Gupta 2006.
74Interview with mining ﬁnancier, Bukal, September 2012.
75Sikor and Lund 2009, 1.
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4. Decentralized State Building and the Breakdown of Joint Extraction Regimes
This section transcends the locality in an effort to understand how joint institutions of extraction
on the informal mining frontier relate not only to the broader political economy of mining, but by
extension also to broader trajectories of state formation in the Philippines. I argue that the
existence of joint extraction regimes centered on the informal economy is not surprising when
the long-standing tradition of decentralized state building in the Philippines is considered. I
will also draw attention to how the recent expansion of large-scale mining is very likely to
upset these institutional arrangements, with possibly profound consequences for sociopolitical
stability.
4.1. Decentralized State Building and Joint Extraction Regimes
Despite a history of de jure centralization, in reality the Philippines has always been characterized
by a high degree of decentralization. Already under American colonial rule – in the ﬁrst half of the
twentieth century – local- and provincial-level power brokers retained a high degree of autonomy in
Manila,76 including discretionary control over the state’s coercive machinery.77 This local auton-
omy persisted after independence, when local elites were absorbed by a nascent mass democracy
built around political party networks that served primarily as mechanisms for the disbursement
of patronage to local politicians, who in turn delivered local votes to their national counterparts.78
The Marcos regime (1972–1986) achieved some success in reining in selected local power brokers,
but it did not overturn the localist basis of Philippine politics altogether.79 Instead, the local govern-
ment code of 1991, which was presented as a radical move away from a historically rooted central-
ism and a response to the authoritarian excesses of martial law,80 was in fact a conﬁrmation and
arguably even a radicalization of this long-standing tradition of decentralized rule.81
According to John Sidel, this history of decentralized state building has given rise to a coer-
cive form of local politics, with local “bosses” relying on discretionary control over local state
institutions and the state’s coercive apparatus to wield control in the local (informal)82
economy.83 With economic modernization, political-economic control began to rely on more
sophisticated forms of regulation (e.g. zoning ordinances, licenses and franchises), with local
politicians transforming themselves into brokers operating on behalf of landed interests and com-
mercial capital.84 While these claims are partly in line with the empirical analysis presented in
Section 3, attention has also been drawn to a degree of reciprocity in local politics built around
joint institutions of extraction that serve the interests of both local politicians and local land-
owners and mining ﬁnanciers. (To be sure, these two categories overlap.)
In this section, meanwhile, I draw attention to a second manifestation of reciprocity, namely
that between local- and national-level elites. In the ﬁrst instance, while local politicians
derive personal wealth and ﬁscal revenues from informal small-scale mining, the Bangko
Sentral (Philippine Central Bank) has long been buying SSM gold on a “no questions asked”
basis. For decades, small-scale mining has been the number one source of national gold
76Hutchcroft 2000.
77Sidel 1999; Hedman and Sidel 2000, Chap. 3.
78Landé 1968.
79Hutchcroft 2000.
80On the Philippine experience of decentralization, see Eaton 2001.
81Hutchcroft 2000.
82Lara and Schoofs 2013.
83Sidel 1999 and Hedman and Sidel 2000.
84Sidel 1999.
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reserves,85 a fact that hints at the existence of joint institutions of extraction at the local and
national levels. Approached from a different angle, and perhaps more fundamentally, reciprocity
between local- and national-level elites resides in local politicians’ contributions to sociopolitical
stability and to state resilience on the upland frontier.86 First, local politicians use their authority
and the resources at their disposal for local conﬂict resolution.87 More broadly, they contribute to
“pacifying, confronting, co-opting and surrendering” forces that compete with the state – prime
among which are the rebel movements.88 Second, local politicians’ increased reliance on the
ﬁscal-regulatory repertoire of the state to expand control over the informal mining economy –
which, in turn, strengthens their own authority – simultaneously contributes to a continual repro-
duction of the “idea of the state”89 and to a broader acceptance of legal-bureaucratic rule in the
“unruly uplands.”90 In short, the existence of joint institutions of extraction in the informal
mining economy should be understood as a constitutive part of a broader elite pact that connects
national elites with local politicians, with the latter fulﬁlling a key role in “sustaining the state’s
administrative reach and politico-military control.”91
4.2. Large-scale Mining and the Destabilization of the Mineral Frontier?
There are now important indications that sections of the national-level elite are now reneging on
their side of this elite pact, leading to a breakdown of joint extraction regimes built around infor-
mal small-scale mining. First, the national government has seemingly given up on its share of
SSM gold, obtained through ofﬁcial Bangko Sentral buying stations throughout the country.
As noted in the introduction, in an effort to beef up the ﬁscal revenues from small-scale
mining, in 2011 the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) imposed a 5 percent withholding tax
and a 2 percent excise tax on gold sales to the central bank.92 As a result, ofﬁcial gold sales
declined by more than 90 percent and illegal trade in gold skyrocketed (Figure 1). Furthermore,
Executive Order 79, which the government of Benigno Aquino (2010–) introduced in 2012 in an
effort to rationalize the mining sector and attract more investment, contained several measures
aimed at combatting illegal small-scale mining.93 In Sierra Leone, a similar disintegration of
joint extraction regimes, in this case built around the country’s abundant alluvial diamond
wealth, contributed to a ﬁscal crisis, regime breakdown and eventually the country’s descent
into chaos.94 While it is unlikely that the elimination of small-scale mining’s contribution to
the national gold reserves would cause a ﬁscal crisis let alone regime breakdown in the Philip-
pines, a second trend that is now becoming apparent is likely to generate substantial sociopolitical
upheaval at the subnational level: the expansion of large-scale mining.
After the enactment of the 1995Mining Act as the centerpiece of mineral resource governance
in the Philippines, the national government, through the Mines and Geosciences Bureau, began
issuing permits to large-scale mining companies for the exploration and development of the coun-
try’s mineral reserves. As a result, as Figure 4 illustrates, most SSM areas in Compostela Valley
85Interview with anonymous respondent, Quezon City, March 2013.
86Abinales 2000 and Wong 2006.
87See also Adam and Verbrugge 2014.
88Wong 2006, 262.
89Lund 2006.
90Scott 2009.
91Lara and Schoofs 2013, 249.
92For background on this issue, see http://www.rappler.com/business/special-report/whymining/whymining-
latest-stories/18717-bsp-s-9-mo-gold-purchases-from-small-miners-nosedive-94 (accessed 26 June 2014).
93For an analysis of executive order 79, see La Viña and De Leon 2012.
94Snyder 2006.
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are now enveloped within large-scale mining concessions. Until very recently these companies’
presence on the ground was limited.95 However, increased international (mainly Chinese) demand
for gold, copper and other mineral resources in recent years has encouraged an intensiﬁcation of
exploration, and several companies are now making plans to move into the production phase.96
The expansion of large-scale mining is now the subject of heated debates involving civil society
activists, academics and (mainly) left-leaning politicians alike, all blaming “the government” for
supporting the mining sector with complete disregard for local populations.97 As I illustrated at
Figure 4. Location of small-scale mining areas.
Notes: The mining tenements map was provided by the Provincial Agricultural Ofﬁce (PAGRO) of Compos-
tela Valley (situation as of June 2011). On this map, I have attempted to indicate the location of SSM areas
(black crosses) that were identiﬁed through personal observations and a map hanging in the barangay hall of
Mt. Diwata, Monkayo municipality.
95APEX mining in Maco municipality is a notable expansion.
96On the recent Chinese incursions in the Philippine mining sector, see Wong et al. 2013.
97Holden 2005.
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length in Section 3, such a view obscures how local miner-politicians emboldened by
decentralization98 have emerged as the regulatory protégées of small-scale mining. In the
remainder of this section, I illustrate how large-scale mining expansion and the associated pro-
liferation of overlapping claims to mineral wealth, respectively, by small- and large-scale
miners, is highly likely to upset sociopolitical stability by undermining joint extraction regimes
at the local level.
In barangay Bukal, for one, Alsons Development and Investment Co., Inc., has been issued
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement No. 094-97-XI. The company is using a multipronged
strategy: handing out cease-and-desist orders issued by the Mines and Geosciences Bureau to
small-scale miners and negotiating with barangay authorities to enable a smooth entry into the
locality. So far, however, the company’s presence on the ground is still in an embryonic stage.
However, in other areas the entry of large-scale mining has led to rising tensions and even conﬂict.
Rather than playing out simply between small- and large-scale mining operations, these conﬂicts
typically involve indistinct and dynamic coalitions of politico-military actors that defy easy cat-
egorization in terms of state/non-state and in some cases even insurgency/counterinsurgency.
However, in line with the analysis presented above, local would-be politicians occupy central
positions in these coalitions.
The Diwalwal case in Monkayo municipality, in the north of the Compostela Valley Province,
illustrates these claims. In the early 1980s, small-scale gold mining activities, similar to those
found elsewhere in the region, began to proliferate in the Diwalwal area.99 These activities under-
went a gradual process of capitalization, with Sino-Filipino merchant capital in particular invest-
ing in the further development of tunneling and processing activities, enabling much higher levels
of output. This capitalization went hand in hand with the creation of indistinct cartels between
these mining ﬁnanciers as well as army commanders, police ofﬁcers, and communist and
Muslim rebels. In time these groups became embroiled in violent conﬂicts over underground
ore bodies. In line with events in Bukal, the situation stabilized somewhat in the 1990s, according
to local miners, mainly because of the interventions of barangay authorities, under the leadership
of charismatic barangay captain Franco Tito and his “peace guards,” as small-scale miners once
euphemistically called the CVOs. Whenever a conﬂict emerged between different tunnel owners,
barangay authorities would intervene to restore order.
This stability the barangay-centered regulatory order provided was upset in the late 1990s,
when Semco, a domestic subsidiary of Canadian Marcopper Mining, entered the scene. Rather
than attempting to wrest control away from existing miners, Semco opted instead to enter into
a murky legal arrangement with JB Mining, one of the major SSM groups operating in Diwalwal.
Beefed up by its association with Semco, JB Mining began to (literally) undermine its competi-
tors, and this led to a renewed escalation of the dirty underground war: this time pitting informal,
small-scale miners – many of whom no longer qualiﬁed as small scale given their level of capi-
talization – against JB Mining, which now operated in the twilight between informal and formal
medium-scale mining.100 The conﬂict soon spilled over into the political arena: while barangay
authorities were widely presumed to be catering to the interests of small-scale miners, municipal
politics were dominated by the Brilliantes family, which was in charge of JB Mining. Municipal
mayor Joel Brilliantes used his mayoral prerogatives and his connections inside the army as a
former military intelligence ofﬁcer to harass his informal mining foes both legally and physically.
98Of particular relevance here are the Local Government Code of 1991, the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991
and the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997.
99For a journalistic account of the Diwalwal gold rush, see Gonzales and Conde 2002.
100Personal interviews, but see also Regelado 2000 and Gonzales and Conde 2002.
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In 2003, mounting tensions culminated in the assassination of the mayor, allegedly by elements
connected with small-scale miners and the NPA.101 In addition, the enactment of the Indigenous
People’s Rights Act in 1997 sparked intense and even bloody competition over mining royalties
between tribal groups that had started siding with mining investors and local politicians.102 In
2008, in a blunt effort to restore peace and order in Diwalwal, the government of Gloria Maca-
pagal-Arroyo (2001–2010) decided to nationalize the area by turning it into a mineral reservation
and by sending in the armed forces, purportedly to rid the area of communist insurgents.103 In the
end, subsequent national government interventions have largely failed to defuse tensions in
Diwalwal, and the widely held sentiment among small-scale miners is that the beefed-up presence
of military and police forces are furthering the interests of JB Mining and its large-scale mining
peers. At several instances, state security forces have purportedly joined hands with JB Mining’s
security guards (the “black ninjas”) to protect JB’s tunnels or to disperse protesting small-scale
miners.104
5. Conclusion
The entry point of this article was an empirical analysis of the anatomy of the local state on the
eastern Mindanao mining frontier. Building on critical academic literature concerning the
relationship between the informal mining economy and the state I have argued that, rather than
being detrimental to state power, the expansion of informal small-scale gold mining in recent
decades has paradoxically gone hand in hand with, and has been facilitated by, the consolidation
of state rule in the purportedly unruly uplands.105 This parallel process of SSM expansion and
state consolidation is epitomized by the emergence of “joint institutions of extraction”106 that
serve the interests of an indistinct coalition of local miner-politicians and various “capital inter-
ests”107 involved in small-scale mining. Even leaving aside their personal involvement in small-
scale mining, local miner-politicians use the sector as a source of ﬁscal revenues and as a platform
to assert their authority. At the same time, mining ﬁnanciers and informal landowners beneﬁt from
the regulatory interventions these same politicians support, notably the provision of protection
services and the legitimation and arguably even formalization of otherwise informal land- and
mineral-tenure arrangements.
Transcending the locality, these joint extraction regimes at the local level are a constitutive
part of a broader, historically rooted pact between local politicians and national-level elites
whereby the former, in exchange for their prerogatives in the local informal mining economy,
fulﬁll key roles as frontier “stabilizers” and as agents of democratic state rule. At the same
time, I also drew attention to the threats posed by the expansion of large-scale mining, which
is undermining existing joint extraction regimes in the informal mining economy, and upsetting
sociopolitical stability in the process.
To be sure, the long-term effects of large-scale mining expansion on sociopolitical stability are
as of yet undetermined, and much will depend on the inclusiveness of the new institutional
arrangements accompanying this expansion. Local politicians – many of whom are known to
have a stake in small-scale mining – are now trying to convince mining companies to come to
101“Compostela Valley Mayor…” 2003.
102Interview with anonymous respondent, Davao City, February 2012.
103Regelado 2009.
104Gonzales and Conde 2002.
105Scott 2009.
106Snyder 2006.
107Verbrugge 2014.
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a solution that takes into account the interests of the different players that currently derive their
wealth and power from small-scale mining. The provincial governor, in particular, is now
trying to reconcile the interests of local SSM elites and mining companies, in what was widely
referred to as a win-win solution. Yet mining companies seem reluctant to accept such a nego-
tiated solution, opting instead for militarization, bringing in military, para-military and/or
private security forces in an attempt to monopolize access to mineral resources. Furthermore,
even if some of these mining companies eventually prove willing to toe the consensual line,
the hoped-for win-win solution is unlikely to meet the needs of the tens of thousands that now
depend on small-scale mining for their everyday survival. In the long term, both social justice
and sociopolitical stability would be best served by solutions aimed at including local populations
as a whole, rather than merely those individuals who command the necessary “policing power” to
subdue local resistance to the entry of large-scale mining.
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